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Abstract 
Stock market reaction to mergers and acquisitions announcements is a topical issue in corporate finance. 
Consequently, the topic has received attention in equal measure; however, the bulk of these studies are skewed 
towards the developed financial markets. The foregoing evidence raises a fundamental question; is the empirical 
evidence exhibited in developed financial markets applicable in the emerging markets? Using data from listed 
firms in Eastern Africa securities market involved in mergers and acquisitions for the period 1996- 2015, we 
computed cumulative abnormal returns for different holding period. Parametric t test was used to test the 
significance of the abnormal returns. Our findings revealed that acquirer firm shareholders earned a significant 
positive cumulative abnormal return during the entire event window that is [-20, +20].  On the other hand, 
cumulative average abnormal return findings revealed that acquiring firms earned positive return immediately 
after the acquisition announcement. However, the positive performance was short lived, four days after M&A 
announcement returns declined sharply.  
Keywords: Mergers and acquisition, cumulative abnormal return and Cumulative average abnormal return. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) activities continue to be popular as a means of corporate restructuring and 
growth around the world. Moreover, these activities are considered a changing agent. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by the ever changing composition of the 500 largest U.S firms. Of the original 500 corporations that 
composed the so called Fortune 500 at its inception in 1955, only 70 firms can be found on the list today 
(Depamphilis, 2011; Yena & Andre, 2007). This is a condition that is replicated in many securities markets 
worldwide with most corporations being eliminated either through a merger or an acquisition. Conversely, as the 
jungle law takes control, new corporations are formed. 
A vast number of papers have documented that globally; M&A’s have been analyzed and classified into 
six global M&A waves over the last 120 years. However, the focus has been on developed economies (Gaughan, 
2011; Betrand & Betschinger, 2012; Berk DeMarzo & Harford 2012). Scientific literature offers two hypothesis 
for the occurrence of M&A waves; neoclassical and behavioral hypothesis. Neoclassical theory argues that 
M&A waves occur when firms in the industries react to technological, regulatory or economic shock in their 
operating environments (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Harford, 2005; Brealy, Myers & Allen, 2011). On the 
other hand, behavioral theory postulates that long term fluctuations in market valuation are positively correlated 
with the number of takeovers (Ang & Chen, 2006). 
In Africa, literature provides little history on M&A activities. However, it is has been documented that 
over the last decade, M&A activities in Africa have increased immensely. In 2010, Africa recorded a high M&A 
value of US$44 billion. Since then M&A activities have increased at compound interest of 14% during the four 
years between (2010- 2014) (UNCTAD, 2014). This could be largely attributed to weak confidence in the 
international market.  
In a pivotal paper, using a sample of U.S acquirers in Africa, Triki & Chun (2011) report that over the 
last two decades, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of acquisition of African businesses by 
foreign companies. In this paper, it is reported that over the last one decade, often, intra African mergers precede 
acquisition by foreign companies. Noted also is that in most cases, foreign corporations are much eager to 
establish a foot print in Africa. However, due to lack of the necessary local knowledge, quite often they wait for 
an African company to reach a certain scale before they make a move. For example, significant proportion of 
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about 53% of one hundred and fifty two (152) M&A deals completed in Africa in year 2011 were between 
African nations (Tyre & Lindsay, 2012).  
Contrary to the past evidence that indicated low levels of M&A activities in Eastern Africa region,  
recent statistics shows that M&A deal volume have increased at a compound interest of 18% since 2010 (KPMG, 
2014; Bloomberg & Reuters, 2014). The region has become an attractive target for M&A activities as investors 
flock in, in anticipation of the long term growth prospects (Marembo, 2011). Notably, the financial service sector 
has witnessed significant increase in M&A transactions. Going forward the sector is expected to experience 
increased significant deals due to the revised regulatory capital requirement. Secondly, the wide ranges of 
macroeconomic, structural and institutional reforms undertaken by countries in Eastern Africa have improved 
the investment climate in the region and as a consequence M&A activities have increased in all sectors (Opolot, 
Mutenyo & Kalio, 2009).  
KPMG’s Deal Space Report of 2014 showed that in Eastern Africa, Kenya has been leading in   M&A 
activities. The country has experienced substantial increase in M&A activities with over 134 transactions closed 
from the year 2010. The establishment of Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) under the Competition Act 
Cap 504 laws of Kenya is associated with impressive growth in M&A activities in the country (RoK, 2014; Inoti, 
Onyuma & Muiru, 2014). In addition, the thriving information, communication and technology (ICT) sector has 
also contributed to increase in M&A activities significantly. Going forward, M&A activities are set to heighten 
due to increased business confidence, consumer demand and improving economic conditions.  
Amidst the positive trend in Eastern Africa M&A activities, studies examining market reaction to M&A 
announcements in the region are very few (Kariri, 2013). This is largely a function of limited availability of 
reliable data concerning M&A transactions (Triki & Chun, 2011). Given the widely documented evidence in the 
developed financial markets that M&A activities are value destroying to the bidder firm shareholders, there is a 
felt need to conduct an elaborate study in Eastern Africa region to substantiate whether the empirical evidence 
exhibited in developed financial markets is different from the evidence from emerging markets. Our research is 
an attempt to fill this important gap in M&A literature. Specifically, we examine whether M&A activities create 
significant wealth to the shareholders of the acquiring company.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows; section 1.1 reviews the empirical literature, section 
2 describes the methodology, section 3 describes our data, section 4 present the findings while section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
1.1 Empirical Literature 
Theoretical motivations for M&As’ are quite many but most importantly mergers and acquisition activities are 
initiated to generate operating and financial synergies that can, in turn, foster corporate growth, boost 
profitability, and improve shareholders’ wealth. (Depamphilis, 2011). Synergies are considered important 
determinants of shareholders wealth creation (Houston, James & Ryngaert, 2001; Delong, 2003). Equally, M&A 
constitute investment activities and-; accordingly the net additional cash flow present value generated from these 
investment decisions should be positive. Nonetheless, a survey of empirical studies mostly concentrated in U.S 
and U.K markets reveals that on aggregate acquiring firm shareholders experience insignificant positive 
abnormal returns or significant negative abnormal returns around M&A announcement dates (Alexandridis, 
Petmezas & Travlos, 2010). On the other hand, researchers seem to agree on the debate around target firm 
shareholders’ return to M&A announcements. The empirical findings appear consistent over time since the first 
review of takeover literature by Jensen & Ruback (1983). On average, target firms shareholders experience 
significant positive returns (Uygur, Meric & Meric, 2014).  
A greater percentage of Mergers and acquisitions studies have been done in U.S markets among them 
those of Andrade, Mitchell & Stafford (2001), Moeller, Schlingermann & Stulz (2005), Harrison, oler & Allen 
(2005). Andrade et al. (2001) noted that evidence on value creation for acquiring firm shareholders remains a 
puzzle. In their study, the 3 days abnormal return for acquirer was  0.7% while in the longer event the return was 
-3.8%  both of which were statistically insignificant making it difficult to conclude that acquiring firms were 
losers in an acquisition transaction. Similarly, Oler et al. (2008) used a sample of 2500 U.S horizontal 
acquisitions to determine the effect of an acquisition announcement. Their findings showed that the initial 
market response to an acquisition announcement is positive; however, this was contradicted by negative returns 
in the long run, perhaps suggesting that short-window event studies alone should not be used to capture 
economic impact of a strategic action.  
In a different study, Moeller et al. (2005) examined a total of 4,136 U.S acquiring firm returns from 
year 1998 to 2001. The trio observed that acquiring firm shareholder lost 12% cents per dollar spent during the 
acquisition announcements of 1998 through 2001, whereas in the 1980s they lost 1.6% cents per dollar. 
Martynova and Renneboog (2006) did a comprehensive study of European takeover market; investigating the 
shareholder wealth effect of two thousand four hundred and nineteen (2,419) mergers and acquisitions. They 
found that the announcement effect to the bidder firm was statistically significant at only 0.5 %. Similarly, 
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Dilshad (2013) conducted a study on profitability analysis of European mergers and acquisition, using a sample 
of eighteen (18) firms involved in M&A in the banking sector from 2001 to 2010. Evidence from this study 
illustrated a significant cumulative abnormal return for the acquirer banks in the short run.  
Although most of the extant M&A studies have been done in developed financial markets, some studies 
have examined M&A announcement effects on the shareholders wealth in emerging markets. Sehgal, Banerjee 
& Deisting (2012) examined the impact of M&A announcements using a sample of 214 companies from BRICK 
market for a period between 2005 through 2009. Post event abnormal returns for India, South Korea and China 
firms were significantly negative while strong positive returns were reported for South Africa. No significant 
cumulative average abnormal returns were reported in Brazil and Russia.  Overall, on average, significant 
negative post event abnormal return were reported for BRICK market. In a different paper, Shah & Arora (2014) 
examined a sample of thirty seven (37) merger and acquisitions announcement in the Asia Pacific region in year 
2013 alone, while target firm cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) was positive and significant as 
hypothesized, but on the contrary, bidder firm CAAR was insignificant.  
In Africa, the few country specific studies done appear to report negative returns or no effect in the 
short run. South Africa’s research work on Market reaction to M&A announcements is quite appealing having 
produced mixed findings on this important subject (Bruner, 2002; Viljoen, 2013; Ndadza & Mokoaleli-Makoteli, 
2014). On one hand, Mushdzhi & Ward (2004) report that South African acquiring firms’ shareholders lost 
approximately 0.55% which was significant around the announcement dates. Contrary, Smit and Ward (2007) 
using a sample of 27 firms find that acquiring firms in the same country  neither earns significant positive 
abnormal return nor negative abnormal return in the short run. In Nigeria, Barde and Salisu (2015) observes that 
M&A announcements have no effect on shareholder  wealth in the short run while a study by Kariri (2013) using 
a sample of six (6) firms drawn from commercial banks in Kenya failed to exhibit significant changes in the 11 
days event window. The empirical evidence shows clearly that there is a void that needs to be filled. We also 
note that nearly all studies in Eastern Africa have used the accounting based approach with prevalence to 
financial ratios (Chesang, 2002; Gwaya & Mungai, 2015). Further, these studies dominate the effect of M&A 
announcements in the banking sector. 
 
2.0 Methodology 
Event study approach 
Standard event methodology was used to examine the market reaction to M&A announcement. The first step in 
measuring the effect of an announcement of a merger or an acquisition on stock value entailed defining the event 
period. The event is centered on the announcement date usually designated as date zero in the event time. Before 
the announcement date the estimation period is for 20 days, from day   to relative to the 
announcement day (day 0) and   to   that is 20 days after the announcement of a merger or an 
acquisition. Date zero represented the date the announcement was made for a particular firm and it denoted 
different calendar dates for different firms in the sample. The estimation period after the announcement period 
was 20 days before and 20 days after the announcement day (day 0).  
Secondly, daily actual returns were calculated for all the firms included in the sample. Third, predicted returns 
for each day t in the event period for each firm were estimated using the market model (Golubov, Petmezas & 
Travos, 2012; Harford, Humphery-Jenner & Powel, 2012). The approach begins with the estimation of the model 
parameters; that is, alpha and the beta of the prices for firm i on day t.  Ordinary least squares (OLS) method was 
used to estimate the parameters which were used in the computations of daily predicted returns using the market 
model presented in equation (1). 
                                                                                                       (1)
Where;  represent the return on a market index (the NSE 20 weighted Index for day t),  is a measure of 
the mean return over the period  is coefficient that measures sensitivity of firm i to the market and it is a 
measure of risk. Additionally,   is statistical error term with mean zero and constant variance. The method is 
widely used because it takes explicit account of both the risk associated with the market and the mean return 
(Weston & Weaver, 2002).  The fourth step involved calculation of the abnormal returns which were determined 
by subtracting predicted returns from the actual returns as shown in Equation (2). 
                                                                                                                        (2) 
Where  represent the abnormal return for firm in time t,    represent the actual return for stock i on 
time t.  In this equation,   represent the predicted returns calculated from the market model. To determine the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for each firm, abnormal return for each firm were cumulated over the 
window period (-20, +20). This is presented in Equation (3). 
                                                                                                               (3) 
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To determine the average total effect of the event across all the firms over the event period abnormal returns are 
averaged across the firms to obtain the Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) for that day as presented in Equation 
(4).  
                                                                                                                              (4) 
In Equation 4, n represent the number of firms in the sample. The idea behind averaging across the firms is to 
minimize noise effect. Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) for each day over the entire event period (-20, +20) 
were then cumulated over the entire event period to obtain the Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) 
as presented in Equation (5). 
                                                                                                            (5) 
 
Finally we tested for the significance of the abnormal returns. In line with most event studies parametric t test 
was employed (Kothari & Warner, 2007). The following two hypotheses were tested; 
H0: M&A announcements do not create wealth to the acquiring firm shareholders; that is, CAR =0 
HA: M&A announcements create wealth to the acquiring firm shareholders, that is, CAR 0 
 
The hypothesis was tested for different event window periods including CAR -1+1, CAR -5 +5, CAR -10 +10 
and CAR -20+20 using t values at α of 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
3.0 Data  
This study examined stock market reaction to M&A announcement in the short run using firms listed in the 
securities markets in three Eastern Africa countries involved in mergers and acquisition. The sampling method 
was purposive and included only acquisitions made by acquiring firms listed in the security markets in the three 
Eastern Africa countries including Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania which acquired either a public or a private 
target in the same countries data for the period 1998 through 2015. In addition, for the firm to be included in the 
sample, we ensured that there were no confounding effects (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). After thorough 
scrutiny, a total of 30 (thirty) listed bidder firms constituted our sample. Year 1998 is important because it 
coincided with the liberalization of financial service sector in many Eastern Africa countries (Kodongo, Makoteli 
& Maina, 2014). Meanwhile, year 2015 ensured current data availability. The study employed secondary data 
that was collected from audited annual company reports and central bank reports and publications, Capital 
Market Authority and Nairobi Securities Exchange. 
 
4.0 Study Findings and Discussions 
4.1 Stylized Fact on Mergers and Acquisition Activities in Eastern Africa  
Table 4.1 presents the country distribution of completed listed M&A activities made by firms listed in the 
securities markets in the three Eastern Africa Countries under study.  The study focused on public quoted 
companies making private or public acquisition in the three Eastern Africa Countries. The findings show that 
Kenya is leading in M&A activities, during the period under study, the country recorded 80% of the total deals 
while Tanzania and Uganda took a share of 10% each. Our findings maps well into the recent Deal Drivers 
Report published by Merger markets, that ranked Kenya as Africa’s fourth most sought country for M&A 
(Zerdin, 2014). 
Table 4.1: Country Distribution of Completed M&A Made by Listed Firms in Eastern Africa 
Countries  Frequency Percentage  
Kenya 24 80 
Uganda 3 10 
Tanzania 3 10 
Total  30 100 
Figure 4.1 presents sector distribution of listed and completed M&A’s in the three Eastern African 
countries.  Notably, the financial service sector attracted the highest number of M&A transactions recording 
53.33% of total completed public M&A transaction. This is due to the revised regulatory capital requirement in 
the banking sector within the three countries. Manufacturing sector came in second attracting 13.33% of the total 
public M&As’ while both energy & petroleum and commercial & services sectors took third position with each 
sector attracting 10% each of the total M&A. Finally, technology and investment sectors took fourth position 
with each sector attracting 6.67% of the total completed public M&A transaction. These results could be pointed 
to the macroeconomic, structural and institutional reforms undertaken by these countries which have improved 
the investment climate in the region thereby raising business confidence.   
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Figure 4.1: Sector Distribution of Completed Public M&A in Eastern Africa 
 
4.2 Event Study Results 
Figure 4.2 represents beta values for the firms under study. The beta coefficient for each company was 
categorized as either defensive if the beta coefficient was less than 1 and aggressive if it was greater than 1. We 
observed that M&A announcements had no effect on the risk factor measured by beta in most of the firms. This 
is supported by the fact that about sixteen (16) firms which were defensive before M&A announcement 
remained so after the event. In addition, five companies reported as being aggressive securities before the event 
failed to change after the event. However, on the minority some companies changed from being aggressive to 
being defensive after the event announcement and include C04, C11, C15, C19, C23, C24 and C29. In contrast 
two companies that is, C12 and C26 changed from being defensive to being aggressive securities after the 
announcement of the event.  
 
Figure 4.2: Summary of Beta Values Analysis before and after the M&A for all the Firms 
Table 4.2 present results of a one-sample t test at 95% level of confidence and an analysis of cumulative 
abnormal returns around the announcement day to the M&A firms. The table shows the cumulative abnormal 
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returns (CAR) and the respective t-statistics for various sub–windows within the event window. The various 
holding periods include CAR , CAR , CAR , CAR  and 
CAR .  The study hypothesized that M&A’s announcements do not create wealth to the firms 
shareholders that is CAR=0 while the alternative stated that M&A’s announcement create wealth to the firm that 
is CAR 0. Cumulative abnormal return [-10, +10] had a t-statistic of 2.115 with a P value of value of 0.043, 
this was significant at 5%. We therefore rejected the null hypothesis and conclude that M&A’s announcements 
generate significant returns to the firms’ shareholders during the event period . Considering CAR 
 and CAR  there was enough to warrant rejection of the null since their P values were 
0.089 and 0.066 both of which were significant at 10%. Finally, cumulative abnormal returns for the event 
window  and  were insignificant 10% since their p-values were 0.461 and 0.243 and thus 
we failed to reject the null hypothesis. It was therefore concluded that for the event period  
and , M&A’s announcements do not create wealth to the firms’ shareholders.  
Table 4.2: Showing Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Different Holding Periods  
 
T Df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
CAR  1.762 29 .089* .01631 -.0026 .0352 
CAR  1.908 29 .066* .05982 -.0043 .1239 
CAR  2.115 29 .043** .02042 .0007 .0402 
CAR  0.747 29 .461 .02261 -.0393 .0845 
CAR  1.193 29 .243 .01242 -.0089 .0337 
Our results for event window period for CAR ,  and CAR  
suggest positive returns; this is consistent with the findings of Oler, Harrison &Allen (2008), Sehgal, Banerjee & 
Deisting (2012) and Dilshad (2013) who reported significant positive returns in the short run for the U.S BRICK 
and Europe markets respectively.  On the other hand, cumulative abnormal return for the event period 
 and  are insignificant implying that M&A do not generate returns. These findings are in 
agreement with research findings of Jensen & Ruback (1983), Smit & Ward (2007), Martynova & Renneboog 
(2008) and Barde & Salisu (2015) who reported no returns to shareholders mergers and acquisition firms in the 
short run. On average, the research findings are in agreement with the existing evidence which show mixed 
performance of firm following M&A. Overall, the event study results shows that abnormal return to merger and 
acquisitions announcements are dependent on the event window period under consideration, this is evidenced by 
the variation of the significance of cumulative abnormal returns in different holding event periods. 
Figure 4.3 present average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulate average abnormal returns (CAAR) 
for the entire event window that is  days. The results shows on average pre – M&A announcement 
returns are very volatile; this trend however does not seem to disappear post M&A. The findings also revealed 
that announcements return increases from day zero, the positive performance is however short lived, six (6) days 
after the event announcement cumulative average abnormal returns starts decreasing sharply from after which 
firms experience negative returns all through. We therefore conclude that on average post M&A announcements 
returns are negative. 
These results are consistent with research findings of Mushdzhi & Ward (2004) and Moeller et al. (2004, 
2005) who reported negative returns for South African firms and U.S firm respectively. Bharath & Guojun (2006) 
argue that there are several determinants of volatility in M&A announcement returns. The first reason is that 
there could be shock in the industry and firms may react by engaging in M&A activities, following a successful 
M&A volatility in returns may stabilize or decline.   Second, the element of post merger integration risk and 
based on this argument if the process is completed successfully the volatility should decrease – at least in the 
short run. The third reason is borrowed from portfolio diversification principle which state that volatility should 
decline following any merger, for inter industries M&A volatility should decline more.  Our result shows on 
average CAAR are negative therefore post merger integration risk outweighs any diversification benefits in the 
immediate aftermath of M&A. 
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Figure 4.3: Average Abnormal Return and Cumulative Average Abnormal Return for 
Listed Firms in Eastern Africa Securities Markets Involved in Mergers and 
Acquisition for the Window Period  Days 
 
5.0 Conclusion  
This study sought to provide empirical understanding of market reaction to M&A announcements in the short 
run using listed bidder firms in Eastern Africa securities  markets. M Market model was employed to estimate 
return following M&A announcement. Significance test on return was carried out for different holding period. 
Cumulative abnormal returns for the holding periods , [-10, +10] and  were significant 
at 5% and 10%. We therefore concluded that M&A generate significant returns to the shareholders of the bidder 
firms during the three mentioned holding periods. Cumulative abnormal returns for the event window 
 and  were insignificant. It was therefore concluded that for the event period  
and , M&A do not create wealth to the shareholders of firm. Finally, cumulative average abnormal 
return (CAAR) post M&A was negative and therefore conclusion was made that on average M&A activities do 
not generate wealth to the acquiring  firm shareholders. 
We highlight that caution should be exercised when interpreting short run event studies. Event studies 
assumes that market are effecient and the events are unanticipated, however, in practice the assumptions may not 
hold especially in emerging markets. Therefore, to conclusively evaluate the impact of M&A announcement 
event studies should be supplemented with long run market based measures. We acknowlegde that long run 
evaluation of market return to M&A announcement can be a problematic undertaking and may be susceptible to 
confounding effect. The study suggest use of large sample and adequate control in computation of long run 
return to reduce noise effects. 
In total, listed thirty (30)  M&A firms were studied. These, could be considered few and hence less 
representative in wider jurisdiction. The choice of this geographical scope was informed by budgetary 
constraints facing the researcher. Therefore, the applicability of the study findings should be restrictive given the 
small size of the sample. An extended study could therefore  be carried out within a larger jurisdiction such as 
Sub Saharan Africa or Africa as whole to reduce potential sampling bias that may have impacted this study. 
Finally,  this study resticted itself to market reaction to M&A announcements,  similar studies should be 
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undertaken to find out the effect of M&A announcement on volatility of announcement returns and risk. It would 
be interesting to find out how firm risk and volatility behaves following M&A annoucements in M&A firms in 
Eastern Africa Securities markets and beyond. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix III: Summary of Beta Values Analysis Before and After the M&A in the Short run. 
    Beta Factor 
S/N Company 
Before 
(CAR –1,+1) Details 
After 
(CAR –1,+1 Details 
1 C01 -0.859 D -1.888 D 
2 C02 0.061 D 0.768 D 
3 C03 -0.044 D 0.040 D 
4 C04 2.699 A 0.666 D 
5 C05 1.815 A 1.270 A 
6 C06 1.941 A 1.074 A 
7 C07 -3.555 D 0.809 D 
8 C08 -0.299 D 0.813 D 
9 C09 -0.289 D 0.450 D 
10 C10 0.816 D -2.019 D 
11 C11 3.203 A 0.069 D 
12 C12 -0.551 D 1.22 A 
13 C13 0.461 D 0.904 D 
14 C14 -1.271 D -1.181 D 
15 C15 1.134 A -2.890 D 
16 C16 -0.776 D -0.927 D 
17 C17 0.558 D 0.212 D 
18 C18 0.568 D 0.594 D 
19 C19 1.776 A -0.735 D 
20 C20 1.408 A 3.732 A 
21 C21 0.628 D 0.577 D 
22 C22 -0.076 D -0.101 D 
23 C23 2.316 A -0.797 D 
24 C24 2.621 A -0.514 D 
25 C25 0.670 D -1.326 D 
26 C26 -1.342 D 1.1490 A 
27 C27 1.098 A 2.592 A 
28 C28 1.098 A 2.592 A 
29 C29 1.232 A 0.807 D 
30 C30 -1.853 D -0.396 D 
D = defensive security, A= aggressive security. 
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Appendix 1V: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Different Holding Periods in the Short run 
S/N 
Company  
Code CAR -20, +20 CAR -10, +10 CAR -5, +5 CAR -2,+2 CAR -1, +1 
1 C01 0.074 0.071 0.047 0.078 0.023 
2 C02 0.018 -0.010 0.024 0.031 -0.004 
3 C03 0.020 0.017 0.010 0.047 -0.001 
4 C04 0.853 0.395 0.169 0.036 0.111 
5 C05 0.009 0.029 0.076 0.019 0.083 
6 C06 0.045 0.076 0.049 0.043 0.043 
7 C07 0.208 0.325 0.158 0.104 0.081 
8 C08 0.130 0.010 0.016 -0.091 -0.058 
9 C09 -0.049 -0.914 -0.475 -0.872 -0.482 
10 C10 -0.027 0.102 -0.059 0.045 0.077 
11 C11 -0.050 -0.020 -0.091 -0.022 -0.024 
12 C12 0.039 0.071 -0.079 -0.032 -0.015 
13 C13 0.025 -0.028 0.009 0.065 0.0618 
14 C14 0.045 0.076 0.077 0.028 0.028 
15 C15 -0.116 -0.109 -0.155 -0.012 0.090 
16 C16 0.024 -0.042 0.035 -0.043 -0.060 
17 C17 0.021 0.007 0.044 0.134 -0.057 
18 C18 -0.038 0.006 -0.023 -0.107 -0.057 
19 C19 -0.010 -0.016 -0.017 0.021 0.017 
20 C20 0.010 0.021 0.0158 0.017 -0.013 
21 C21 0.034 -0.051 -0.030 0.027 0.017 
22 C22 0.011 -0.028 0.037 0.0041 0.001 
23 C23 0.050 -0.008 -0.042 0.003 0.038 
24 C24 0.016 -0.004 -0.081 -0.089 0.068 
25 C25 -0.053 0.132 0.152 -0.020 0.054 
26 C26 0.013 0.070 0.060 -0.002 0.007 
27 C27 -0.062 0.028 -0.028 0.008 -0.001 
28 C28 0.270 -0.558 0.048 0.057 0.042 
29 C29 0.233 2.116 0.650 1.605 -0.032 
30 C30 0.050 0.051 0.087 0.054 0.051 
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Appendix V: Average Abnormal Return (AAR) and Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) for 
the holding period -20, +20. 
Event Period Average Abnormal Return  (AAR) Cumulative  Average Abnormal Return  (CAAR) 
-20 0.01 0.00 
-19 -0.02 -0.02 
-18 -0.02 -0.05 
-17 0.02 -0.03 
-16 -0.02 -0.05 
-15 0.03 -0.02 
-14 -0.02 -0.04 
-13 -0.01 -0.05 
-12 0.02 -0.04 
-11 -0.02 -0.05 
-10 0.03 -0.02 
-9 -0.03 -0.05 
-8 0.03 -0.03 
-7 -0.02 -0.04 
-6 0.03 -0.02 
-5 -0.02 -0.04 
-4 0.03 -0.01 
-3 -0.02 -0.03 
-2 0.02 -0.01 
-1 0.00 -0.01 
1 0.01 0.00 
2 0.05 0.05 
3 0.05 0.11 
4 0.02 0.13 
5 0.02 0.15 
6 0.00 0.15 
7 -0.02 0.13 
8 -0.01 0.12 
9 -0.01 0.11 
10 -0.01 0.10 
11 -0.02 0.08 
12 -0.01 0.07 
13 -0.02 0.05 
14 -0.02 0.03 
15 -0.01 0.02 
16 -0.03 -0.01 
17 -0.03 -0.03 
18 -0.01 -0.05 
            19 -0.01 -0.06 
20 0.00 -0.06 
 
 
 
